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A Strategic Approach to
Network Defense: Framing
the Cloud
Timothy K. Buennemeyer

T

With cheap technology and minimal investment, current and potential adversaries operating in cyberspace can inflict serious damage to
DOD’s vast information grid—a system that encompasses more than
15,000 local, regional, and wide-area networks, and approximately 7
million information technology devices.1
—Robert Gates, former US Secretary of Defense

he US Government has robust data networks that provide rapid transport
of imagery, textual information, command and control data, and routine
communications to support military operations and core business needs.
This information is vital in the conduct of its war and peacetime missions.
Historically, America’s adversaries attempt to leverage network vulnerabilities
to gain strategic advantage by exploiting information about US military and
commercial activities, trade secrets, financial information, system architectures,
and other data. The US is arguably the most interconnected nation on earth and
it plays a hegemonic role with regard to establishing and maintaining the rules
that govern the Internet. Americans embrace digital technologies that promise
greater interconnection for governmental, corporate, and personal utility.
This article examines current Internet attack trends in the computer
networking environment and proposes an enhanced framework for strategic
system defense applicable to both corporate and federal networks. Presently,
the balance of power favors those adversaries trying to attack US information
systems, networks, and critical infrastructure. Well-designed cloud computing
environments, however, may change the balance in favor of the defense, while
reducing costs and improving service. The enhanced framework addresses
these issues and assists in reducing the risks associated with assessing and
adopting cloud computing.
Computing clouds are large data centers, filled with generic processing
and storage facilities, and operated as multiple reconfigurable virtual servers.2
Colonel Timothy K. Buennemeyer, Ph.D., is a 2011 graduate of the US Army
War College and winner of the Daniel M. Lewin Cyber-Terrorism Technology Writing
Award. Currently, he is the Military Advisor for Net-Centric, Space, and Missile Defense
Systems, working for the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation on the Secretary
of Defense staff. He also teaches a graduate-level cybersecurity course for the Masters
of Information Technology program at Virginia Tech.
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Traditionally, cloud computing was represented by the outsourcing of an organization’s computing infrastructure. Today, cloud computing presents “a model
for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with
minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”3

Why Cloud Computing?
Emerging cloud computing technologies will subsume existing enterprise networks and encompass system defenses that are designed, implemented,
and managed at corporate information technology (IT) processing centers.
Once applications are logically extended through virtualization in a cloud computing environment, they are no longer tied to a physical location. The cloud
service provider develops dispersed support and hosting facilities that allow
applications to perform as needed. The system user merely needs to access the
typically web-based application to run the desired program.
The trend for networking infrastructures and computing centers is shifting toward consolidation for cost savings. Cloud computing provides for the
outsourcing of entire data centers, the saving of physical space, infrastructure,
and labor costs. The prime benefit is the reduced cost of updating information
systems and infrastructures, which is transferred to the cloud provider.4 Cloud
computing is a major evolutionary leap that virtualizes servers, infrastructures,
and software as pay-for-use services. Government leaders have identified the
benefits gained by adopting cloud computing, but they have not adequately
considered the inherent risk with outsourcing IT.
Envisioning the future, the US Chief Information Officer (CIO)
announced the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative and issued instructions for the Federal CIO Council to have governmental departments inventory
their IT assets and integrate consolidation plans into their 2012 planning
budgets.5 The goal is to reduce IT costs, labor, energy, and physical space usage
leading to the closing of 800 computing centers by 2015.6 Based on this proposed
migration, there is a critical need for an expanded defensive framework that
includes an evolving cloud computing environment built on accepted network
security principles. This expanded defensive framework would assist enterprise
networking and cloud computing architects to design more secure systems.
Cloud service models describe IT design capabilities and levels of autonomy for customers. There are three accepted industry-wide cloud service models:
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Infrastructureas-a-Service (IaaS).7 The initial capabilities migrating to cloud environments are
electronic mail, content archiving, and vendor-provided SaaS applications. All
benefit from consolidation into a virtualized cloud environment because these
capabilities tend to require much lower processing cycles on servers.
There is, however, a migration paradox with various IT capabilities.
Computational high-cycle-rate applications, transactional databases, and financial systems, mainly due to regulatory requirements, are ill-suited for cloud
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computing. With SaaS and PaaS, the customer cannot alter the cloud environment.
SaaS is the most restrictive of these models and only provides vendor-delivered
applications for customer use, while PaaS permits customers to create programs
using provided development tools and multiple coding languages.8 IaaS allows
customers to operate on-demand virtual hardware, load software, control
firewalls, and adjust networking components.9 Within this model, the cloud provider manages their physical servers; however, customers that employ their own
applications in PaaS and their virtual servers in IaaS can maintain and secure
the applications and virtual systems, respectively. The implication is that if an
organization is already lacking in its security regime, then migrating to a cloud
environment will not necessarily improve the overall security posture. Lastly,
government and private sector budgets are shrinking, so IT and data security
investments need to accomplish more with less. Adopting cloud computing is no
panacea but it may assist in accomplishing these cost-saving efforts.

Cyberspace and Network Defense
Cyberspace is defined in Joint Publication 1-02 as “a global domain
within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network
of IT infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks,
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”10 Cyberspace
is a contested domain, and the nation is “vulnerable to threats posed in cyberspace, while at the same time, dependent upon unfettered access.”11
The Internet is proliferating around the globe, connecting diverse people
in an expansive cyberworld. The combination of affordable IT and rapidly
expanding interconnectivity is changing the way government, business, and
individuals think, interact, and work. The networks provide the means to share
information and make cyberspace, in a broader sense, a global commons for
electronic information in the same fashion that the high seas provide the means
to share commodities across a commons for maritime trade.12 Like the sea,
cyberspace is international and available for all to use. It is a shared resource
that is loosely governed, routinely navigated via myriad uncharted routes, and,
of increasing concern, often not well-secured.
As a new global commons, cyberspace is rapidly becoming a volatile,
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment where governments, businesses, and individuals need to balance an information triad of confidentiality,
availability, and integrity in order to establish a stable information security
model. Confidentiality is the term used to describe preventing the disclosure
of information to unauthorized individuals or systems. In information security,
integrity means data cannot be modified undetectably.13 For any information
system to serve its purpose, data must be available when it is needed. This model
is known as the CIA Triad of information assurance (IA), as shown in Figure 1.
Security models are critical in today’s interconnected world, because
information is routinely stored in data centers, providing continuous access at
the speed of electronic transfer. At the basic architectural level, there are system
hardware, software, and communications equities that must be protected. In
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this security model, the triad’s three design
directions are often at the extremes and
tradeoffs can potentially frustrate each
other, so system designers endeavor to
find equilibrium. Favoring any one design
direction may compromise the integrity of
the other triad pillars. This means for computing systems used to store and process
the information, the security controls
used to protect it, and the communication
channels used to access it must function
well and be in balance within the security
model.15
DOD Directive 8500.01E establishes roles and responsibilities, proceFigure 1. CIA Triad14
dures, and processes while defining the
components of the CIA Triad.16 IA is the means by which IT managers attempt
to protect, maintain, and provide IT security for their organization through the
training, testing, and monitoring of controls designed to secure an information
resource.17 IA offers measures that defend information by ensuring availability,
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation, while providing
for restoration of information systems through the incorporation of protection,
detection, and reaction capabilities.18 With today’s networks, IA measures are
implemented through a Defense-in-Depth framework of layered security that
extends from the originating network to the endpoint computer. These measures need to be expanded further to reduce risk more effectively in emerging
cloud computing environments, while still addressing Internet attack vectors
and vulnerabilities that may threaten the global information commons.

Framing the Strategic Environment of Cyberspace
Attacks in cyberspace are fast and can simultaneously target an individual or a broad spectrum of systems. Attackers are often anonymous with
few concerns regarding attribution. The instantaneous nature and the ability to
attack the entire domain simultaneously make cyberspace potentially a much
more dangerous and vulnerable environment for the unprepared than the traditional warfighting domains.19
IT is crucial to every aspect of modern life, and a serious attack could
cripple emergency services, defense networks, health care delivery, and power
generation.20 A cyber campaign would almost certainly be directed against the
country’s critical infrastructure, crossing boundaries between government and
the private sector, and, if sophisticated and coordinated, could have an immediate impact along with delayed consequences.21
According to the US Computer Emergency Readiness Team, cyberthreats against the US are broadly categorized into five potentially overlapping
groups: national governments, terrorists, industrial spies and organized crime
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groups, hacktivists, and hackers.22 Any of these groups can significantly impact
US communication and System Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) infrastructures. Of greatest concern are national-level cyberwarfare programs
that pose threats along the entire spectrum of objectives capable of harming
US interests.23 Among the array of cyberthreats, only foreign governmentsponsored programs are developing capabilities with the prospect of causing
widespread, long-duration damage to US critical infrastructures.24
Traditional terrorist adversaries of the United States, despite their
intentions to damage American interests, are less refined in their computer
network capabilities and the ability to pursue cyber means rather than other
adversaries.25 They pose only a limited cyberthreat. The US should anticipate
that substantial cyberthreats are possible in the future as a more technically
competent generation of adversaries matures.26 The majority of hackers do
not have the motive or requisite tradecraft to threaten critical US networks.
Nevertheless, the worldwide population of hackers poses a relatively high
threat of an isolated disruption causing serious damage, including the extensive
destruction of property and loss of life. As the hacker population grows, so
does the likelihood of a highly skilled and malicious hacker attempting and
succeeding in such an attack.27
According to Symantec, the United States was the top-ranked country
for malicious activity, accounting for 23 percent of all attacks, as shown in
Table 1.28 It is apparent from this report that malicious activity is also prevalent
in the developed nations of the world, and attacks are capable of crossing all
boundaries regardless of governmental, commercial, economic, and individual
affiliation. The Internet is a permissive commons and as a consequence, so is
its associated malicious actors, activities, and threats.
Malicious
Spam
Code
Zombies
Rank
Rank

Phishing
Website
Hosts
Rank

Bots
Rank

Attack
Origin
Rank

2

1

Rank

Country/Region

%

1

United States

23

1

3

1

2

Brazil

6

6

2

10

3

3

3

India

6

2

1

30

20

8

4

Germany

5

11

5

3

4

7

5

China

4

3

28

7

6

2

6

United Kingdom

4

4

7

4

9

4

7

Taiwan

4

23

12

15

1

9

8

Italy

4

21

11

11

5

6

9

Russia

3

15

9

8

16

5

10

Canada

3

8

41

2

17

12

Table 1. Malicious Activity by Country and Region 29
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While nonstate sponsored computer network exploitation poses a
serious risk to US national security, those exploits are less troubling when compared to a nation-state threat, such as that of China, which seeks to go beyond
cyber espionage in order to achieve military effects in cyberspace.30 Specific
information regarding attacks against US Government networks and attribution is classified, so only representative open-source information is available,
as in Table 1. From the discussion of SCADA attacks, one can surmise military
effects, such as a shutdown of regional power generation systems and the susceptibility of distribution networks to data theft, are all plausible examples of
the broad range of possible threats. As IT becomes increasingly integrated into
every facet of American life, US national security planners view its pervasiveness as a target and weapon; it is the one critical component on which modern
societies depend, a dependence not lost on potential enemies.31
The US Government identified the IT sector as an area of the nation’s
critical infrastructure and aligned its protection under the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) in 2009.32 According to the National Academy of
Engineering, cybersystems are the weakest link in our national security.33
Many of these vulnerabilities are directly linked to the SCADA systems that
manage critical utilities—electrical grids, water supplies, sewer flows, and gas
transmissions—across America. Older SCADA systems incorporated limited
security and operated on closed communication systems, but most modern
SCADA systems use the Internet to pass information.34 Thus, SCADA systems
are exposed to asymmetrical attacks.35 SCADA attacks pose a critical threat,
because direct control of these systems could create the potential for large-scale
power outages or man-made environmental disasters.36 It is estimated that for
every 24 hours of SCADA down time from a major attack there would be $6.3
million in damages with the greatest costs in the oil and gas sectors.37
Over the years, various commissions have examined cybersecurity, focusing their efforts on SCADA systems, communications, financial networks, and
other network-enabled infrastructures. Reports from these efforts conclude US
critical infrastructures are increasingly dependent on information and communication systems, and this dependence is a growing source of vulnerabilities.38
Presidential Executive Order 13286 required the United States to protect against
“disruption of the operation of information systems for critical infrastructure
and help to protect the people, economy, essential human and government
services, and national security of the US, and to ensure any disruptions that in
fact occur are infrequent, of minimal duration, manageable, and cause the least
damage possible.”39
Dennis Blair, former Director of National Intelligence, stated, “the cyber
criminal sector, in particular, has displayed remarkable technical innovation
with an agility presently exceeding the response capability of network defenders
. . . . Criminals are collaborating globally and exchanging tools and expertise to
circumvent defensive efforts, which makes it increasingly difficult for network
defenders and law enforcement to detect and disrupt malicious activities.”40
Internet-related economic losses reached $42 billion in the United States and
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$140 billion worldwide in 2008, while globally, companies may have lost over $1
trillion worth of intellectual property due to data theft.41 Stolen trade secrets and
proprietary research, lost royalties, patent infringements, and leaked financial
information comprise a growing list of data lost in Internet-related thefts.
The security firm McAfee surveyed over 1,000 businesses regarding
possible data loss. Their survey has national security implications; its results
indicate substantial amounts of vital information, such as intellectual property
and sensitive customer data, transferred between companies and continents are
being lost.42 The report concludes that companies lost on average $4.6 million
worth of intellectual property in 2008.43 It is difficult to evaluate the total financial losses to businesses because companies are reluctant to report figures due
to concerns over losing consumer confidence. It costs an average of $600,000
per firm to respond to each security breach involving the loss of information.
This figure only reflects the reported cleanup costs, legal fees, and victim notifications; it does not include the infrastructure costs associated with prevention
and detection.44 McAfee’s research further revealed that respondents worried
far more about their company’s reputation due to public relations damages and
information leakage than they did about the financial impact.45 Thus, an examination of defensive capabilities to protect US cyberspace is necessary.

Network Defense Options in a Cloud Computing Environment
Network defenses may be classic or modern. Figure 2 presents the
classic security “onion” diagram employed in traditional IT environments.
It focuses on the physical, procedural, technical, and personnel security that
impact the core IT components of data, applications, hosts, and networks.

Figure 2. Classic IT Security “Onion”

Over time, more robust defensive constructs evolved to better protect
information, servers, systems, and transport communications. As newer
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capabilities emerge, defensive technologies adapt. Previously, technology companies fielded new capabilities into the marketplace as rapidly as possible with
security measures following as an afterthought. This strategy frequently left
security gaps in organizational computing environments. In today’s environment, security is a basic design consideration when systems are first proposed,
and technologies lacking these defensible capabilities are doomed. A modern
information security construct is outlined in Figure 3. While this security construct is not all inclusive, it is representative of the defense-in-depth concept
that will continue to evolve as new capabilities and mediums enter cyberspace.46

Figure 3. Modern Layered IT Defense Adapted from DHS Cyber Defense Strategy47

Bearing in mind both classic and modern network security defenses, it
should be pointed out that simply migrating an organization’s IT capabilities to
a cloud environment does not abdicate the data owner’s security responsibilities. Cloud computing does not change the existing defensive means available
to security specialists. In truth, the center of gravity in cloud computing is
the physical servers, and their protection is paramount. If physical servers are
compromised, then the hosted computers will likely be compromised. This
places a heightened focus on the provider’s abilities to protect the physical
servers. Statistics indicate one-third of breaches result from lost or stolen
laptop computers and employees accidentally exposing data on the Internet;
nearly 16 percent of breaches are due to insider theft.48 When a user logs out
from cloud computing services, the browser can be set to flush automatically,
leaving nothing of value on the remote computer. Security concerns with cloud
computing are more a cultural issue associated with outsourcing rather than
any proven design weakness.49
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Cloud Computing Network Defense Examination
Due to ever expanding US interests, a strategic cybersecurity framework for cloud computing should be developed to shape protection efforts for
US cyber infrastructure, communication systems, and commercial, financial,
and military networks, protecting them from a wide range of crippling attacks
and exploitive threats. Failure to protect governmental, military, and commercial networks can lead to the loss of intellectual property, trade secrets, and
much more. The compromise of these crucial networks would create chaos in
the banking, governmental, and military sectors.
Securing networks with a physical infrastructure presents known system environments to defend. Cloud environments require additional risk consideration because the capabilities, data, and software are virtualized, while
the physical infrastructure is outsourced and may reside outside the governance
laws of a particular country. Traditional network security frameworks, such as
the defense-in-depth approach, are applied to fixed networks to secure physical IT environments; however, this approach may not be adequate for cloud
computing environments because systems are virtual and potentially mobile.
Additionally, networking’s instantaneous nature and adversaries’ ability to
attack the entire cyber domain make cloud computing potentially vulnerable.50
Physical and virtual borders are critical because cloud providers select
their sites based on economic, connectivity, power availability, and security
criteria, and they often have to make special arrangements between countries
regarding data movement restrictions.51 A growing number of people believe
cloud computing represents a paradigm shift on par with the development of
mainframes, personal computing, client-server computing, and the Internet.52
System owners are generally risk adverse, so adopting cloud computing as a
solution requires a comprehensive defensive framework in an effort to ensure
security. While cloud services are being used, experts cite security, interoperability, and portability as major challenges to further adoption.53 Conversely,
senior IT leader expectation is for enabling cost savings while increasing the
ability to quickly create and deploy enterprise applications.54 This is where
current policy and subsequent security framework are lacking. Working with
agencies, industry, and academe to correct this lack of security, the National
Institute of Standards and Technology is leading the development of standards
related to security, interoperability, and portability for the US CIO.55 The
expectation is the development and fielding of well-defined standards capable
of shortening the adoption cycle, enabling cost savings, and increasing the
ability to deploy enterprise applications. Additionally, a government-wide risk
and authorization program for cloud computing will permit agencies to use the
authorization by another agency with the objective of driving a set of common
services across the government supported by the entire community, rather than
an agency-specific risk model.56 This effort is critical because it will reduce the
burden in the performance of IA certification and accreditation of applications
and systems, resulting in greater cost efficiency.
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Network State-of-the-Art Risk Framework
Industry-wide IA best business practices and computer defensive measures are not uniformly implemented, so a framework is necessary to assist
with prioritizing and coordinating these defensive efforts. Cybersecurity is not
just about deploying specific technologies to counter risks, as such; an effective security program for any organization will depend on its willingness to
accept security as a constant constraint on all cyber activities.57 The critical
aspect for cloud environments is to understand what the new and inherent risks
are and how this change in service delivery might be affected. Risk assessments are a cornerstone in defining, understanding, and planning remediation
efforts against various threats, potential vulnerabilities, and architectural
design flaws.58 The establishment of an enhanced defensive framework for
cloud environments is only prudent. According to the DHS, a defense-in-depth
framework at a minimum should include:
•• Know the security risks that an organization faces.
•• Quantify and qualify risks.
•• Use key resources to mitigate security risks.
•• Define each resource’s core competency and identify any overlapping
areas.
•• Abide by existing or emerging security standards for specific controls.
•• Create and customize specific controls that are unique to an organization.59
Understanding a framework is a guide for assessing risk—this framework provides a valuable starting point. In a traditional layered defensive
construct, the systems tend to be collocated in relatively close proximity within
an area processing center, often managed by the data owner.
The challenge of increasing security to cloud computing is twofold.
First, the owner’s data and systems are often outsourced to an external cloud
environment provider, so the owner no longer sets the environment’s security policy or maintains its security posture. Second, cloud environments are
established and interconnected in multiple locations. Their physical servers
are often located in geographical areas where expenses in terms of labor and
governmental regulation are minimal.
There are hidden drawbacks nested amongst the benefits of entering
into a cloud environment. For example, an organization may benefit through
the reduction of technical staff, which can free up labor and capital. However,
governance of the cloud environment is not transparent, so the data owner
may unknowingly inherit higher risk for intrusion from the provider. Once
an organization outsources its technical support, it is difficult to reestablish
organic technical skill sets. Simply stated, it takes years to develop institutional knowledge and then apply that knowledge to technical solutions. Cost
savings is often the driving force for adopting cloud computing. The technical
benefits are scalability and flexibility that permit an organization to pay for
cloud computing resources as required. One example comes from the private
sector, when one cloud environment allowed for increased response capability as demand jumped from 25,000 to more than 250,000 users in less than a
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week.60 Because of cloud computing, the company was able to scale from 50 to
4,000 virtual machines in three days to support this increased demand.61 This
capability would take significantly longer under the government and military’s
current construct, so the adoption of cloud computing comes down to costs,
technical staff capabilities, risks, and benefits. All these factors need to be
carefully weighed when making the decision to migrate to cloud computing.

State-of-the-Art Risk Framework for Cloud Computing
Along with the tendency for cloud environment outsourcing, this article
proposes adding five additional areas to the existing defense-in-depth framework. Below are the proposed areas:
•• Assess the security posture of the cloud environment.
•• Know the physical location of the actual cloud computing center(s).
•• Understand your service-level expectation relative to perceived risks.
•• Assess applicable governance, laws, regulations and policies.
•• Know your tolerance for service interruption, data loss, and recovery.
With these additional framework layers, organizations will be better
able to assess their information security posture. Having an accurate and welldocumented architecture and complementary risk assessment enables an organization to be more security conscious, deploy effective threat countermeasures,
and be equipped to recognize and understand security incidents more readily.62
Through cloud computing, the service provider establishes cloud architecture,
security posture, and provides the service delivery. It is incumbent on the service
and data owner to fully appreciate and assess all environmental risks.

Applicability for Federal Enterprise Environments
The DOD operates one of the largest and most robust enterprise computing environments in the world. Although the DOD’s network structure
is linked, the military services typically operate distinct domains, so it will
require a major financial and labor initiative to migrate to a cloud environment. This consolidation effort will cause the military departments to examine
IT investments from a Title 10 perspective, possibly limiting their autonomy
with regard to their individual mandates to man, equip, and outfit their forces.
Migration to a cloud environment will likely occur incrementally over the next
5-10 years and could allow for the recapitalization of hundreds of millions of
dollars in network operating funds. As shown in Table 2, the DOD currently
spends over $36.3 billion annually for IT.63
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Total FY2011
Spending (Billions)

No. of Total
Investments

Department of the Army

$7.3

256

Department of the Air Force

$6.8

651

Department of the Navy

$7.6

789

Bureau

Department of Defense Agencies

$14.6

536

Department of Defense (Total)

$36.3

2,232

Table 2. DOD IT Portfolio Budget for FY201164

The government, as part of a broader IT transformation, needs to fundamentally shift its mindset from building custom systems to adopting light
computing technologies and utilizing shared cloud solutions.65 This shift is absolutely necessary because the various departments typically build systems that
duplicate capabilities and lack integration, causing unnecessary IT redundancies
and increased costs. The explosion in the number of federal data centers from
432 in 1998 to 2,094 in 2010 highlights the rapidity of this ongoing IT expansion.66 With a subjective examination of the DOD IT expenditures juxtaposed
across the Federal Government, one can sense the potential cost savings in the
billions of dollars simply by eliminating IT redundancies, consolidating server
farms and data centers into cloud environments, and reducing technical staff.
Information services should enable the government to better serve the
American people. Despite spending more than $600 billion on IT over the past
decade, the government has achieved little in terms of the productivity improvements as compared to the private sector.67 This growth alone reflects federal
employees’ ever-increasing dependency on IT. Unless checked by a transition
to cloud computing, this IT growth trend will persist and expand. The National
Security Agency is trimming its allocation to IA from $915 million in 2010 to
$902 million in 2011.68 It is likely this trend of reducing expenditures for IT
security will continue across the government as budgets tighten.
IT projects often run over budget, fall behind schedule, or fail to
deliver promised functionality, because the project designer’s approach simply
aims to deliver full functionality against a specific suspense, rather than
modularizing projects into more manageable chunks and demanding new
functionality at established time periods.69 This progress is further complicated by a reliance on proprietary application and system design, something
cloud solutions might resolve. This new way of designing systems amounts
to a major change in mindset as well as an adjustment to the key functions of
management and staffing. If cloud computing is the next generation environment, then the technical staff will require extensive training. Although there
will likely be reductions in technical staffing areas, such as system administrators, network monitoring personnel, and router and gateway administrators,
there is a probability for increases in application and data developers. It is a
fact that experienced technical staff often help translate organizational missions and visions into complex multimedia presentations, using integrated IT
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capabilities. Thus, the loss of these experienced IT staff members may result
in a reduction of organizational effectiveness.

Conclusion
Research has revealed the challenges associated with providing network
defense in the current enterprise environment and recognized that consolidating
area processing centers into cloud environments is the likely future migration
path. The primary reasons for adopting a cloud environment are rapid scalability and flexibility with SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS. There is a perception that
migrating to cloud computing will also yield cost savings through reduced
physical infrastructure and technical staff. While a cloud environment may significantly reduce physical infrastructure requirements, it may not significantly
reduce staffing requirements as departments would still require technical staff
to maintain the virtual servers and manage data.
Additionally, this article proposed an enhanced defensive framework
to better assess the risks of cloud computing. While the existing framework is
valuable, the added assessment areas address the dynamic nature of cloud computing and afford the system owner improved attack risk mitigation through a
more complete assessment of the environment.
The 2010 Joint Operating Environment predicts network connectivity will grow by 50 percent a year, providing 100,000 times more bandwidth
in 2030 than today; and computers will run one million times faster. If these
predictions become reality, a home computer would be capable of downloading the entire Library of Congress in 128 seconds.70 With these predictions in
mind, it is almost a certainty that security challenges and the sophistication of
attacks will increase proportionately. The greatest concern for government and
businesses is being lulled into a false sense of security by migration to cloud
environments. The benefits of such a migration are equally apparent, but the
consolidation of multiple virtual machines into an outsourced cloud computing
environment will incur an undeniable risk. Ultimately, such decisions come
down to data owner cost and risk considerations, expectations, and the ability
to accept not having complete control of their systems.
With commitment, careful planning, and systematic implementation,
those designing the defense need to incorporate cyberspace’s virtual world if
there is to be any chance of limiting damage in the real world.71 The defense
of virtual computers is more akin to holding atmosphere in your hand or
cyberspace as the case may be. Clausewitz stated, “The defender is at greatest
disadvantage when compelled to protect a wide area against multiple axes of
advance. In this instance, the attacker using surprise may throw his full strength
at any one point.”72 Conclusively, the network defense employs a substantially
greater means by which to preserve security in computing environments. This
fact may result in the attacker actually having the initiative and an asymmetric advantage in cyberspace. Well-designed cloud computing environments,
however, may provide an opportunity to change the balance back in favor of
the defense, while reducing costs and improving service.
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